SCOTUS decision as published in the New York Times last evening:
QUOTE: "We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision,...
abortion is fundamentally different, as both Roe and Casey acknowledged, because it destroys what those decisions called “fetal life” and what the law now before us describes as an “unborn human being.”
Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to Roe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division....
Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of the instrument,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 186-189 (1824), which offers a “fixed standard” for ascertaining what our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §399, p. 383 (1833).
The Constitution makes no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim that it protects such a right must show that the right is somehow implicit in the constitutional text....
Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in American law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state constitutional provision had recognized such a right. Until a few years before Roe was handed down, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. Nor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware. And although law review articles are not reticent about advocating new rights, the earliest article proposing a constitutional right to abortion that has come to our attention was published only a few years before Roe. Not only was there no support for such a constitutional right until shortly before Roe, but abortion had long been a crime in every single State. At common law, abortion was criminal in at least some stages of pregnancy and was regarded as unlawful and could have very serious consequences at all stages. American law followed the common law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s expanded criminal liability for abortions. By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of the States had made abortion a crime at any stage of pregnancy, and the remaining States would soon follow....
We begin with the common law, under which abortion was a crime at least after “quickening”—i.e., the first felt movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.”4 The “eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone, Coke, Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. __, ____ (2020) (slip op., at 7), all describe abortion after quickening as criminal. Henry de Bracton’s 13th-century treatise explained that if a person has “struck a pregnant woman, or has given her poison, whereby he has caused abortion, if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated, he commits homicide.” 2 De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 279 (T. Twiss ed. 1879); see also 1 Fleta, c. 23, reprinted in 72 Selden Soc. 60— 61 (H. Richardson & G. Sayles eds. 1955) (13th-century treatise).
Sir Edward Coke’s 17th-century treatise likewise asserted that abortion of a quick child was “murder” if the “childe be born alive” and a “great misprision” if the “childe dieth in her body.” 3 Institutes of the Laws of England 50— 51 (1644). (“Misprision” referred to “some heynous offence under the degree of felony.” Id., at 139.) Two treatises by Sir Matthew Hale likewise described abortion of a quick child who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great misprision.” Pleas of the Crown 53 (P. Glazebrook ed. 1972); 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale). And writing near the time of the adoption of our Constitution, William Blackstone explained that abortion of a “quick” child was “by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter” (citing Bracton), and at least a very “heinous misdemeanor” (citing Coke). 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 129-130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone).
English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century corroborate the treatises’ statements that abortion was a crime. See generally J. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History 126, and n. 16, 134-142, 188-194, and nn. 84—86 (2006) (Dellapenna); J. Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law 3-12 (1988) (Keown). In 1732, for example, Eleanor Beare was convicted of “destroying the Foetus in the Womb” of another woman and “thereby causing her to miscarry.”26 For that crime and another “misdemeanor,” Beare was sentenced to two days in the pillory and three years’ imprisonment.
Although a pre-quickening abortion was not itself considered homicide, it does not follow that abortion was permissible at common law—much less that abortion was a legal right. Cf. Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 713 (removal of “common law’s harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide”). Quite to the contrary, in the 1732 case mentioned above, the judge said of the charge of abortion (with no mention of quickening) that he had “never met with a case so barbarous and unnatural.”28 Similarly, an indictment from 1602, which did not distinguish between a prequickening and post-quickening abortion, described abortion as “pernicious” and “against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.” Keown 7 (discussing R. v. Webb, Calendar of Assize Records, Surrey Indictments 512 (1980)).
That the common law did not condone even prequickening abortions is confirmed by what one might call a proto-felony-murder rule. Hale and Blackstone explained a way in which a pre-quickening abortion could rise to the level of a homicide. Hale wrote that if a physician gave a woman “with child” a “potion” to cause an abortion, and the woman died, it was “murder” because the potion was given “unlawfully to destroy her child within her.” 1 Hale 429— 430 (emphasis added). As Blackstone explained, to be “murder” a killing had to be done with “malice aforethought, ... either express or implied.” 4 Blackstone 198 (emphasis deleted). In the case of an abortionist, Blackstone wrote, “the law will imply [malice]” for the same reason that it would imply malice if a person who intended to kill one person accidentally killed a different person:
“(If one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other. The same is the case, where one lays poison for A; and B, against whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it, and it kills him; this is likewise murder. So also, if one gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abortion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman, this is murder in the person who gave it.” Id., at 200— 201 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Notably, Blackstone, like Hale, did not state that this proto-felony-murder rule required that the woman be “with quick child”—only that she be “with child.” Jd., at 201. And it is revealing that Hale and Blackstone treated abortionists differently from other physicians or surgeons who caused the death of a patient “without any intent of doing [the patient] any bodily hurt.” Hale 429; see 4 Blackstone 197. These other physicians—even if “unlicensed”—would not be “guilty of murder or manslaughter.” Hale 429. But a physician performing an abortion would, precisely because his aim was an “unlawful” one. In sum, although common-law authorities differed on the severity of punishment for abortions committed at different points in pregnancy, none endorsed the practice. Moreover, we are aware of no common-law case or authority, and the parties have not pointed to any, that remotely suggests a positive right to procure an abortion at any stage of pregnancy.
II. B. 2. b.
In this country, the historical record is similar. The “most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008), reported Blackstone’s statement that abortion of a quick child was at least “a heinous misdemeanor,” 2 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 129-130 (1803), and that edition also included Blackstone’s discussion of the proto-felony-murder rule, 5 id., at 200-201. Manuals for justices of the peace printed in the Colonies in the 18th century typically restated the common-law rule on abortion, and some manuals repeated Hale’s and Blackstone’s statements that anyone who prescribed medication “unlawfully to destroy the child” would be guilty of murder if the woman died. See, e.g., J. Parker, Conductor Generalis 220 (1788); 2 R. Burn, Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 221-222 (7th ed. 1762) (English manual stating the same).2° The few cases available from the early colonial period corroborate that abortion was a crime. See generally Dellapenna 215-228 (collecting cases). In Maryland in 1652, for example, an indictment charged that a man “Murtherously endeavoured to destroy or Murther the Child by him begotten in the Womb.” Proprietary v. Mitchell, 10 Md. Archives 80, 183 (1652) (W. Browne ed. 1891). And by the 19th century, courts frequently explained that the common law made abortion of a quick child a crime. See, e.g., Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 52-55 (1849); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 264-268 (1845).
II. B. 2. c.
The original ground for drawing a distinction between pre- and post-quickening abortions is not entirely clear, but some have attributed the rule to the difficulty of proving that a pre-quickening fetus was alive. At that time, there were no scientific methods for detecting pregnancy in its early stages, and thus, as one court put it in 1872: “[U]ntil the period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and whatever may be said of the feotus, the law has fixed upon this period of gestation as the time when the child is endowed with life” because “foetal movements are the first clearly marked and well defined evidences of life.” Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 90 (emphasis added); Cooper, 22 N.J.L., at 56 (“In contemplation of law life commences at the moment of quickening, at that moment when the embryo gives the first physical proof of life, no matter when it first received it” (emphasis added)). The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the basis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quickening the common law did not regard a fetus “as having a ‘separate and independent existence.” Brief for United States 26 (quoting Parker, 50 Mass., at 266). But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law, noting that “to many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person in being.” Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans, 49 N.Y., at 89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850); Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321-322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789).
At any rate, the original ground for the quickening rule is of little importance for present purposes because the rule was abandoned in the 19th century. During that period, treatise writers and commentators criticized the quickening distinction as “neither in accordance with the result of medical experience, nor with the principles of the common law.” F. Wharton, Criminal Law §1220, p. 606 (rev. 4th ed. 1857) (footnotes omitted); see also J. Beck, Researches in Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence 26—28 (2d ed. 1835) (describing the quickening distinction as “absurd” and “injurious”). In 1803, the British Parliament made abortion acrime at all stages of pregnancy and authorized the imposition of severe punishment. See Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803). One scholar has suggested that Parliament’s decision “may partly have been attributable to the medical man’s concern that fetal life should be protected by the law at all stages of gestation.” Keown 22.
In this country during the 19th century, the vast majority of the States enacted statutes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See Appendix A, infra (listing state statutory provisions in chronological order). ..By 1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, threequarters of the States, 28 out of 37, had enacted statutes making abortion a crime even if it was performed before quickening. See ibid. Of the nine States that had not yet criminalized abortion at all stages, all but one did so by 1910. See ibid.
The trend in the Territories that would become the last 13 States was similar: All of them criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy between 1850 (the Kingdom of Hawaii) and 1919 (New Mexico). See Appendix B, infra; see also Casey, 505 U.S., at 952 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Dellapenna 317-819. By the end of the 1950s, according to the Roe Court’s own count, statutes in all but four States and the District of Columbia prohibited abortion “however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother.” 410 U.S., at 139. This overwhelming consensus endured until the day Roe was decided. At that time, also by the Roe Court’s own count, a substantial majority—30 States—still prohibited abortion at all stages except to save the life of the mother. See id., at 118, and n. 2 (listing States). And though Roe discerned a “trend toward liberalization” in about “onethird of the States,” those States still criminalized some abortions and regulated them more stringently than Roe would allow. Id., at 140, and n. 37; Tribe 2. In short, the “Court’s opinion in Roe itself convincingly refutes the notion that the abortion liberty is deeply rooted in the history or tradition of our people.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). II. B. 2. d.The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973... Recall that at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, over three-quarters of the States had adopted statutes criminalizing abortion (usually at all stages of pregnancy), and that from the early 20th century until the day Roe was handed down, every single State had such a law on its books.... There is ample evidence that the passage of these laws was instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a human being. Many judicial decisions from the late 19th and early 20th centuries made that point. See, e.g., Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 301, 31 P. 2d 273, 280 (1934); State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 131-132, 167 P. 1019, 1022-1023 (1917); Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 488, 73 S. 834, 836 (1916); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879 (1913); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 39-40, 105 N. E. 75, 77 (1918); State v. Gedicke, 43 N.J.L. 86, 90 (1881); Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 522-523 (1873); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 1381-132 (1868); Smith, 33 Me., at 57; see also Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14 F. 4th 409, 446, and n. 11 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing cases)...
What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abortion destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an “unborn human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion is “a unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion....
As explained, for more than a century after 1868—including “another half-century” after women gained the constitutional right to vote in 1920, see post, at 15; Amdt. 19—it was firmly established that laws prohibiting abortion like the Texas law at issue in Roe were permissible exercises of state regulatory authority. And today, another half century later, more than half of the States have asked us to overrule Roe and Casey. The dissent cannot establish that a right to abortion has ever been part of this Nation’s tradition....
First, if the “long sweep of history” imposes any restraint on the recognition of unenumerated rights, then Roe was surely wrong, since abortion was never allowed (except to save the life of the mother) in a majority of States for over 100 years before that decision was handed down. Second, it is impossible to defend Roe based on prior precedent because all of the precedents Roe cited, including Griswold and Eisenstadt, were critically different for a reason that we have explained: None of those cases involved the destruction of what Roe called “potential life.” See supra, at 32.
So without support in history or relevant precedent, Roe’s reasoning cannot be defended even under the dissent’s proposed test, and the dissent is forced to rely solely on the fact that a constitutional right to abortion was recognized in Roe and later decisions that accepted Roe’s interpretation. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, those precedents are entitled to careful and respectful consideration, and we engage in that analysis below. But as the Court has reiterated time and time again, adherence to precedent is not “‘an inexorable command.’” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015). There are occasions when past decisions should be overruled, and as we will explain, this is one of them...
Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging. For reasons already explained, Roe’s constitutional analysis was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation of the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely pointed. Roe was on a collision course with the Constitution from the day it was decided,...
wielding nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to address a question of profound moral and social importance that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people. ...As even the Casey plurality recognized, “[a]bortion is a unique act” because it terminates “life or potential life.” 505 U. S., at 852; see also Roe, 410 U.S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently different from marital intimacy,” “marriage,” or “procreation”)....
But we cannot exceed the scope of our authority under the Constitution, and we cannot allow our decisions to be affected by any extraneous influences such as concern about the public’s reaction to our work...
Indeed, in this case, 26 States expressly ask us to overrule Roe and Casey and to return the issue of abortion to the people and their elected representatives. ...
We can only do our job, which is to interpret the law, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly. We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives...Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for such challenges. As we have explained, procuring an abortion is not a fundamental constitutional right because such a right has no basis in the Constitution’s text or in our Nation’s history. See supra, at 8-39....
These legitimate interests include respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of development, Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157-158; the protection of maternal health and safety; the elimination of particularly gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; the preservation of the integrity of the medical profession; the mitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or disability. See id., at 156— 157; Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728— 731 (identifying similar interests)....
We end this opinion where we began. Abortion presents a profound moral question. The Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibiting abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We now overrule those decisions and return that authority to the people and their elected representatives."
[My comment: thank GOD!]
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-dobbs-jackson-analysis-roe-wade.html;
25June2022;10:57pm
And my state Missouri was first in nation to act on that decision and ended elective abortion in Missouri. I am glad I live in a PROLIFE state that recognizes that governments must protect innocent human lives.
Quote:
"Legal abortion came to an end in Missouri on Friday with the activation of the state's "trigger law," banning the procedure minutes after the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its federal constitutionality.... A 2019 law passed by Missouri's Republican legislature says "no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman, except in cases of medical emergency,""
taking effect after the Supreme Court "has overruled, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade." Attorney General Eric Schmitt, a Republican, signed an opinion Friday morning activating the trigger law. "With this attorney general opinion, my Office has effectively ended abortion in Missouri, becoming the first state in the country to do so following the Court’s ruling," said Schmitt...
Republican Gov. Mike Parson also signed a proclamation Friday activating the trigger law, arguing that "nothing in the text, history or tradition of the United States Constitution gave un-elected federal judges authority to regulate abortion.
"Thanks to decades of conservative leaders, Missouri has become one of the most pro-life states in the nation, and our Administration has always fought for the life of every unborn child," Parson said in a statement. "Today, our efforts have produced what generations of Missourians have worked and prayed for:
Today, we have won our fight to protect innocent life."...
Missouri's law makes knowingly performing or inducing an abortion a class B felony, punishable by five to 15 years in prison.
It does not make exceptions for pregnancies resulting from rape or incest...
The ruling from the Supreme Court marks a key victory for anti-abortion activists and conservative lawmakers, who have made overturning Roe their primary political goal and argue that abortion is immoral...
Former Missouri Speaker of the House Elijah Haahr, a Springfield Republican who led the chamber during its passage of that law, said in an interview Friday he felt "almost euphoric, jubilant," and praised the efforts of other Republicans who constructed House Bill 126....
He said abortion opponents and Republicans in the state should now turn to promoting crisis pregnancy care centers, to ensure that "as these babies are born, we want to make sure that they're healthy, that they're born in good situations, that we do everything to help them grow up."
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/politics/2022/06/24/missouri-bans-abortion-governor-parson-activates-trigger-law-after-scotus-roe-v-wade-ruling/7686255001/;
25Jun2022; 8:46pm
Also there are other states acting on end of federal right to abortion, which by the way is good for the U S budget because now the U S taxapayers do not have to provide federal law enforcment to guard killing places, nor does U S Dept of Education have to teach mandatory false doctrine of a so-called "right to abortion" [also known as the right to kill the tiniest most innocent children] in public schools.
In Pennsylvania, Republican gubernatorial nominee Doug Mastriano, a state senator, previously sponsored a "heartbeat" bill that would ban abortions after around six weeks, before most women know they are pregnant. He has expressed support for a total ban without exceptions, including for the life of the mother, and referred to abortion as "genocide."...
In Wisconsin, Friday's decision reinstated an 1849 state law banning all abortions except to save the life of the mother, though litigation challenging the statute is expected....
In Georgia, a "heartbeat" bill appears likely to take effect following the Supreme Court decision...
Some Republican lawmakers in Georgia have advocated for a full abortion ban;" https://www.reuters.com/world/us/abortion-ruling-raises-stakes-key-us-governors-races-2022-06-25/;
25Jun2022;9:54pm
WASHINGTON — Former President Donald Trump no longer holds formal power, but the Supreme Court is ensuring his legacy lives on. By a 6-3 vote Friday, the court erased nearly 50 years of precedent by ruling that the Constitution does not protect a right to abortion. Earlier in the week, by the same margin, the court struck down a New York law that heavily restricted licenses to carry concealed handguns and ruled that police officers can't be sued for violating a suspect's Miranda rights...."
In each of the cases, all three justices appointed by Trump — Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett — voted in the majority....
The Trump-Pence administration was the most pro-life in history," said Kellyanne Conway, a conservative pollster and strategist who served as counselor to Trump in the White House. "The legacy includes courageously nominating constitutionalist judges, including three to the U.S. Supreme Court, support of qualified women's health centers and crisis pregnancy centers, and respect for the sanctity of life and scientific developments," said Conway, who writes about Trump and the anti-abortion movement in her just-released memoir "Here's the Deal."
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/trump-office-supreme-court-ensuring-legacy-lives-rcna35241;
25Jun2022;11:46pm
"WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Friday overturned the landmark Roe v. Wade ruling...The court ruled 6-3 to uphold a Mississippi abortion ban being challenged in the case and 5-4 to overturn Roe..."We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled," Alito wrote in the opinion, which was backed by Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch (also appointed by Trump), Kavanaugh and Barrett.
"The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision,.." https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-wipes-away-constitutional-guarantee-abortion-rights-over-rcna18718;
25Jun2022;11:51pm
Also, so there is no confusion, I am the same white, unmarried [i.e. twice divorced], christian, republican, prolife advocate, artist, Registered Nurse, writer, cartoonist,author,photographer, mother, g-mama, who owns this account and others and has lived in Missouri since Oct 2009 but was born in state of Georgia and educated there at GA Baptist College of Nursing and University of GA. I also have recently updated other blogs of mine one by one, and each time for a specific purpose, including these:
https://gloriapoole-RN-artist.blogspot.com; my #publichealth blog;
https://gloriapoole-paintings.blogspot.com
https://prolife-nurse.blogspot.com
https://words-that-work-LLP.blogspot.com
https://cartooning-by-gloriapoole.blogspot.com
https://artist-gloriapoole.blogspot.com
https://gpoole817.blogspot.com
https://gloria0817.blogspot.com
https://save-the-baby-humans.blogspot.com
https://real-women-have-babies.blogspot.com
https://tapestry-of-life-LLP.blogspot.com
https://publishing-life.blogspot.com
https://news-for-life.blogspot.com
https://glorias_writing.medium.com
http://gloriapoole.livejournal.com
http://gloriapoole-UK.livejournal.com
https://mini-exhibition.blogspot.com
https://lifes-entertainment.blogspot.com; my families' entertainment blog
Posted today 26 June 2022 at 7:24am by me Gloria Poole, Registered Nurse /artist/writer/photographer/author/cartoonist from my own apartment in Springfield Missouri using my own big computer, my own router and my own wired internet into my apartment. Aside for the FBI: today in the url which I read before logging it, was string "KilG "but I modified that just in case, since my first, born with name begins with G! Also for the record I was given the name Gloria Jean Poole at birth. And I legally resumed my maiden name after both divorces , long ago.
